Understanding malware autostart techniques with web data extraction by Gottlieb, Matthew
Rochester Institute of Technology 
RIT Scholar Works 
Theses 
2009 
Understanding malware autostart techniques with web data 
extraction 
Matthew Gottlieb 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.rit.edu/theses 
Recommended Citation 
Gottlieb, Matthew, "Understanding malware autostart techniques with web data extraction" (2009). 
Thesis. Rochester Institute of Technology. Accessed from 
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by RIT Scholar Works. It has been accepted for inclusion in 









Understanding Malware Autostart Techniques 
















Thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the 
degree of Master of Science in  
Networking and Systems Administration 
 
Rochester Institute of Technology 
 
B. Thomas Golisano College 
of 
Computing and Information Sciences 
 
Department of Networking, Security, and Systems Administration 
 
 
August 21, 2009  
  
Rochester Institute of Technology 
 
B. Thomas Golisano College 
of 
Computing and Information Sciences 
 
Master of Science in 
Networking and Systems Administration 
 
 




Student Name: Matthew Gottlieb 
 
 
Thesis Title: Understanding Malware Autostart Techniques 




















Yin Pan          








Rochester Institute of Technology 
 
B. Thomas Golisano College 
of 
Computing and Information Sciences 
 
Master of Science in  







Understanding Malware Autostart Techniques 







I, Matthew Gottlieb, hereby grant permission to the Wallace Library of the 
Rochester Institute of Technology to reproduce my thesis in whole or in part.  





Date: ___________  Signature of Author: __________________________ 
  
Page 4 of 86 
Abstract 
The purpose of this study was to investigate automatic execution methods in Windows 
operating systems, as used and abused by malware.  Using data extracted from the Web, 
information on over 10,000 malware specimens was collected and analyzed, and trends were 
discovered and presented.  Correlations were found between these records and a list of known 
autostart locations for various versions of Windows.  All programming was written in PHP, 
which proved very effective.  A full breakdown of the popularity of each method per year was 
constructed.  It was found that the popularity of many methods has varied greatly over the last 
decade, mostly following operating system releases and security improvements, but with some 
frightening exceptions.  
Page 5 of 86 
Table of Contents 
Abstract ........................................................................................................................................... 4 
Table of Figures ............................................................................................................................... 6 
1 Introduction ............................................................................................................................. 7 
2 Literature Review .................................................................................................................... 9 
2.1 The Malware Epidemic ................................................................................................... 9 
2.2 Malware in the Windows Boot Sequence .................................................................... 10 
2.3 Investigating Malware .................................................................................................. 11 
2.4 Data Extraction ............................................................................................................. 12 
3 Research Goal ........................................................................................................................ 14 
4 Source of Data ....................................................................................................................... 16 
5 Challenges .............................................................................................................................. 18 
6 Methodology Overview ......................................................................................................... 21 
7 Script Details .......................................................................................................................... 24 
8 Results .................................................................................................................................... 31 
8.1 Most Common Methods ............................................................................................... 33 
8.2 Mostly Obsolete Methods ............................................................................................ 37 
8.3 Up-and-Coming Techniques .......................................................................................... 39 
9 Future Work ........................................................................................................................... 42 
10 Conclusion .......................................................................................................................... 43 
11 Works Cited ........................................................................................................................ 44 
12 Appendix ............................................................................................................................ 46 
 
Page 6 of 86 
Table of Figures 
Figure 1: Methodology Overview Flowchart ................................................................................ 21 
Figure 2: Program Flowchart of getids.php .................................................................................. 24 
Figure 3: Program Flowchart for pulldetails.php .......................................................................... 26 
Figure 4: Program Flowchart for fixyear.php ................................................................................ 27 
Figure 5: Program Flowchart for search.php ................................................................................ 29 
Figure 6: Threat Explorer Records per Year .................................................................................. 31 
Figure 7: Autostart Location Findings per Year ............................................................................ 32 
Figure 8: Yearly Findings of HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run ........ 33 
Figure 9: Yearly Findings of HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run ......... 33 
Figure 10: Yearly Findings of HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services .................................. 35 
Figure 11: Yearly Findings of 
HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\Browser Helper Objects ..... 36 
Figure 12: Yearly Findings of 
HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunServices ....................................... 37 
Figure 13: Yearly Findings of WIN.INI ........................................................................................... 38 
Figure 14: Yearly Findings of SYSTEM.INI ..................................................................................... 38 
Figure 15: Yearly Findings of Autorun.inf ..................................................................................... 39 
Figure 16: Yearly Findings for HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image 
Files Execution Options ................................................................................................................. 40 
 
Page 7 of 86 
1 Introduction 
The Internet is home to an enormous collection of knowledge.  This knowledge is spread across 
millions of servers, and made available in countless different formats.  While this information 
can itself be very useful, even more value can be found in the analysis of large amounts of this 
information, to discover patterns and trends that may not be immediately obvious.  The 
process of extracting patterns and correlations from preexisting information is known as data 
extraction. 
One field that is certainly well represented on the Internet is computer security, and 
information technology at large.  With data extraction techniques, this abundance of computer 
security-related information can be analyzed, furthering the understanding of important issues, 
such as the constant fight against malicious software. 
Malicious software, commonly referred to as malware, is a serious concern in the field of 
information technology.  Developments in Internet technologies, such as email and the World 
Wide Web, expose millions of computer systems to the dangerous threat of malware.  An entire 
industry has been created to prevent and protect against malware, with major corporations like 
Symantec investigating the ongoing problem.  Understanding the ways pieces of malware 
function is a critical step in combating this epidemic. 
In previous decades, it was common for malware to make its presence obvious, either by 
catastrophically interrupting a system’s normal operation, or displaying a characteristic 
message to its victims.  Programmers created these pieces of malware with simple intentions, 
as a prank or a way to gain notoriety among their peers.  Today, malware authors have motives 
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that are more serious: money, politics, espionage, and possibly even terrorism.  For these types 
of malware, it is advantageous for the software to run secretly in the background at all times, to 
remain undetected by end users.  When the malware is running, it can gather private 
information, display advertisements, transmit spam messages, or even launch a targeted attack 
against a remote system.  Clearly, the end user will not intentionally execute these programs, 
so they must be launched automatically and invisibly.  This research will help understand these 
“autostart” methods, and discover trends in their use, to assist in the fight against malware. 
By collecting and analyzing data from a malware research organization, usage of these autostart 
methods can be measured, discovering the popularity, and predicting future usage, of each 
method.  This research will use a series of PHP scripts to automatically catalog, download, and 
analyze the information contained in the Symantec Threat Explorer, a collection of information 
on malware behavior.  As the information was not designed to be used in this way, certain 
challenges, such as the nonuniformity of data contained within the Threat Explorer, must be 
surmounted.  The mythology of this research successfully overcomes these challenges to 
produce accurate and reliable results on the usage and popularity trends of malware autostart 
techniques. 
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2 Literature Review 
The topic of malware has generated numerous studies and discussions in recent years.  In 
addition, data extraction is a widely discussed and sometimes contested method research 
method in both educational and commercial circles. 
2.1 The Malware Epidemic 
It is hard to deny that Malware is a problem.  Massive virus outbreaks have been reported to 
bring down computing systems of major corporations.  Spyware has been blamed for cases of 
identity theft.  Anti-malware companies such as Symantec and F-Secure publish periodic reports 
on the malware epidemic. 
One very difficult concept in malware research is the overwhelming number of terms, each with 
many possible definitions.  Some of these definitions overlap or even conflict with others.  In his 
postgraduate thesis, “Taxonomy of Spyware and Empirical Study of Network Drive-By-
Downloads”, Barwinski analyzed many different types of malware and their common behaviors.  
He created multiple VMware virtual machines with varying configurations and exposed them to 
a number of malware threats by visiting various web sites with an automated script.  Barwinski 
then used system-level tools within the virtual environment, both “advanced” Sysinternals 
applications and common end-user anti-malware software, to discover the effects of each piece 
of malware.  His conclusions show the many unauthorized system modifications performed by 
malware. 
In her study “Avoiding the Cyber Pandemic”, Zelonis equated the damage caused by malware to 
medical issues such as HIV/AIDS.  She qualitatively analyzed malware and its effects on 
computer systems over the years, finding the malware issue to be increasingly critical.  Zelonis 
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studied the methods used by pieces of malware to infect machines, as well as the 
vulnerabilities and end-user behaviors they exploit.  She offers advice to prevent the future 
spread of malware, following the analogy of a medical pandemic.   
2.2 Malware in the Windows Boot Sequence 
One of the most important steps in combating malware is to trace its source.  For system 
administrators and PC technicians tasked with removing malware from an affected machine, it 
is necessary to locate how the malware is called by the operating system for automatic 
execution.  There are many ways for the malware to join the boot process, from simple startup 
folders to complex registry keys. 
In their study “Deficiencies in Current Software Protection Mechanisms”, Qattan & Thernelius 
observed numerous well-known Trojan horse malware specimens and documented their 
autostart techniques.  In the process of their research, they used a qualitative method, 
equipped with numerous tools, to observe how malware injects itself into the boot processes of 
its victim machines.   
Barwinski, in “Taxonomy of Spyware”, utilized the freeware Autoruns for Windows tool, 
currently available for download from Microsoft (formerly Sysinternals).  This tool automatically 
searches all known1 autostart locations, including the file system, registry, shell extensions, 
driver packages, and many others.  This tool is extremely valuable to monitor the goal of 
virtually malware, to have its code executed without the user’s consent. 
                                                     
1
 According to Barwinski, even Microsoft does not know all possible autostart capabilities. 
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2.3 Investigating Malware 
One major difficulty in understanding malware is its inherent lack of documentation.  Since this 
software is typically installed without the user’s consent or even knowledge, the author is not 
likely to include any information about what the software does, and especially not how it goes 
about doing it.  Therefore, investigative steps must be taken in order to understand the 
behavior of a piece or entire class of malware. 
One method of malware investigation is observation.  This can be done by comparing the state 
of a system before and after malware activity.  In his doctoral dissertation, “Enabling Internet 
Worms and Malware Investigation and Defense using Virtualization”, Jiang, after intentionally 
making virtualized “honeypot” systems vulnerable to attack, performed forensic analyses on 
the systems.  In different cases, this was done either by simply observing a machine for clues 
(e.g. Windows desktop wallpaper, which is sometimes changed by malware activity), browsing 
a directory (e.g. discovering the presence of enbiei.exe, evidence of Blaster worm activity), or 
perusing tool-assisted log data of the virtual machine. 
In “Reverse Code Engineering”, Konstantin Rozinov of Bell Labs did a complete study on reverse 
engineering a virus to better understand its behavior.  He explained various types of virus 
infection techniques, and chose a simple virus, W32/Bagle, for analysis and reverse code 
engineering.  The virus was not reported to have been executed in any test environment; its 
effects were only explained through annotated code.  In this case, the researcher was proficient 
in code disassembly, and was able to fully understand and explain all aspects of the virus’s 
code.  In effect, this method results in a perfect analysis, with every piece of the virus 
meticulously explained, but in reality, it is inaccessible to many people affected by malware.  
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Since the focus of this study was to explore the usefulness of reverse code engineering in the 
battle against malware, this approach was very appropriate.   
In “Measurement and Analysis of Autonomous Spreading Malware in a University 
Environment”, Goebel, et al. analyzed malware to discover its spread across networks.  They 
used a number of techniques and tools to monitor malware activity, including its effects on the 
local system.  Using the CWSandbox tool for automatic behavior analysis, they were able to log 
the malware specimen’s activity, such as changes to the file system and registry, which can be 
possible autostart targets.  This is a valuable approach to malware analysis, but it fails to show 
the actual, tangible effects that malware can have on a production system.  To better 
demonstrate the effects of malware on a machine, a complete simulation of a production 
system can be utilized. 
The most complete malware analysis reports reside in the databases of major antivirus vendors.  
These companies, like Symantec, Kaspersky, McAfee, etc. are able to dedicate substantial 
resources to the discovery and understanding of all forms of malware, as it is an enormous part 
of their product offerings.  The information these companies make available to the public is 
extremely valuable for malware research, as it describes numerous malware specimens in great 
detail.   
2.4 Data Extraction 
With the amount of information available from the Internet and related technologies, it is 
sometimes difficult to make any valuable conclusions; the amount of data is just overwhelming.  
To make this mass of information understandable, automated computer systems can process 
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this data and present its findings.  Not surprisingly, many data extraction studies focus on 
computing-related data, as it is abundant on the Internet.  In “Mining Web Logs to Debug 
Distant Connectivity Problems”, Kıcıman, et al. described algorithms to extract usable 
information from HTTP server logs, with the goal of identifying intermediate connectivity 
problems.  This study was met with various challenges, but being that the data was all machine-
written, data uniformity was not one of them. 
Another study, “Detecting Mass-Mailing Worm Infected Hosts by Mining DNS Traffic Data”, 
actually applied data mining to the malware problem.  In this study, Ishibashi et al. mined DNS 
data to discover evidence of mass-mailing worms, a type of malware that spreads by email.  
Like the above-mentioned study, Ishibashi et al. worked with machine-produced data, which 
was relatively consistent and easy to work with.  In addition, they were clearly given access to 
this data by working with a major ISP, so automated collection of data was not required. 
One paper that does focus on human-readable text as a target for data mining is “Untangling 
Text Data Mining” by Marti A. Hearst.  In this paper, Hearst explains that text can be a rich 
source of information, but one that is difficult to be understood by a computer.  She mentions 
the value of data mining being beyond “making things easier to find on the web”, the ability to 
extract new information from existing data.  While this paper is not very technically detailed, it 
does describe multiple techniques for mining usable information from text, a concept very 
similar to this study. 
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3 Research Goal 
This thesis provides insight into the automatic launch of malware on Windows operating 
systems.  There are various ways for a piece of malware, once it has initially been executed on a 
machine, to inject itself into that machine’s boot process, ensuring it will be executed each time 
the system is powered on.  In addition to their malicious agenda, these startup processes can 
waste valuable system resources, decreasing end-user productivity and requiring administrator 
action for removal. 
The method of this research also explores the feasibility and challenges of data extraction on a 
human-readable collection of information, the Symantec Threat Explorer.  This database 
catalogs thousands of malware specimens, describing their behaviors: infection mechanisms, 
system modifications (including autostart methods), payloads, and removal instructions.  The 
information is downloaded, searched, and processed with command-line PHP scripts, as an 
additional exercise in PHP’s flexibility as a scripting language. 
The Windows operating system is built to support a large range of hardware, software, and 
system configurations.  To enable this flexibility, Microsoft created multiple methods for an 
application to execute automatically, a desirable feature in many situations, but one that is 
easily exploited for malicious purposes.  These methods range from the easily viewable and 
user-modifiable, such as the Start Menu Startup folder, to the more obscure and difficult to 
pinpoint, those located deep in the registry.  Each of these methods has certain properties to 
be exploited by a piece of malware.  While simple malware might only insert itself into the 
Startup folder or the basic “Run” registry key (HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\
CurrentVersion\Run), where it is executed as an application, more complicated specimens may 
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infect other areas of the registry.  They may run a login script (HKCU\Software\Policies\
Microsoft\Windows\System\Scripts\Logon), replace the Windows shell (HKLM\Software\
Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\Shell), appear as a system service/device 
driver (HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Services), or exploit one of many other uncommon 
features, many not understood by even advanced users. 
This research applies the aforementioned data extraction process to find trends among known 
pieces of malware, regarding their use and exploitation of the autostart capabilities of 
Microsoft Windows.  These trends will explain the past and current state of malware startup 
techniques, as malicious programmers discover increasingly covert methods of launching their 
code, and help predict the future of these exploits, ultimately providing assistance in the 
seemingly endless war against malicious software. 
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4 Source of Data 
The data extraction target, or source of data, for this study is the Symantec Threat Explorer.  
This website is described as “a comprehensive resource for daily, accurate and up-to-date 
information on the latest threats, risks and vulnerabilities.”  As the world’s most popular 
security software vendor (by market share and revenue) (Gartner, Inc., 2009), Symantec has a 
responsibility to understand all types of security threats, including malware.  When a piece of 
malware is discovered, it will be analyzed to discover how it functions, and how to protect 
against it.  This information is utilized in Symantec’s antivirus products, such as Norton Antivirus 
and Symantec Endpoint Security, and is additionally made publically available on the Threat 
Explorer website. 
The Threat Explorer is organized as a human-readable database.  It consists of an alphabetic 
index of malware specimens (Appendix L), a quick view of recently discovered malware, and the 
ability to search the entire content of the database.  Each malware specimen is given its own 
page, linked from the index.  This page is identified by a proprietary Symantec “docid” ID 
number, in the format <http://www.symantec.com/business/security_response/
writeup.jsp?docid=YYYY-MMDD??-????-99>, where ‘YYYY’ is a 4-digit year2, ‘MM’ is a month, 
‘DD’ is a day, and ‘?’ are seemingly arbitrary 0-9 digits. 
The information on each malware specimen’s page is broken down into three tabs, each 
accessible through a variable (“tabid”) appended to the URL querystring.  The first tab, 
“Summary” (tabid=1) contains a basic overview of the malware, with its discovery date, date 
                                                     
2
 While the first 4 digits of the “docid” correlate with discovery date of the malware in over 90% of cases, it is 
sometimes misleading.  Therefore, this value is not used to find trends; the actual year of discovery is used instead. 
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the report was last updated, malware type, vulnerable operating systems, and a brief 
description of the malware.  This tab also describes which Symantec virus definitions (used in 
the company’s antivirus products) include information on this piece of malware.  Finally, in 
more recent articles, a basic threat assessment is provided, with information on the malware’s 
status in the wild, level of damage, and methods of distribution. 
The second tab, “Technical Details” (tabid=2), is the primary focus of this data mining exercise.  
It contains some of the same information as the first tab, such as the discovery date, type of 
malware, and operating systems affected, but it also explains the malware’s behavior in detail.  
Of particular interest to this study, the information on this tab typically describes file system 
and registry modifications, often explaining the autostart techniques used by the malware.  This 
information is written by numerous different authors, each with their own style and format.  
While easy for a knowledgeable human to understand, these differences make automated data 
mining a challenge.  Special processing must be performed to normalize the data into a format 
that can be easily analyzed. 
The third tab, “Removal”, (tabid=3) is of no interest to this study.  It contains end-user 
instructions to eliminate a piece of malware from a compromised machine. 
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5 Challenges 
This study is not without challenges.  Most of these stem from the nature of the Symantec 
Threat Explorer database, and the methods of this research to automatically gather and analyze 
the data contained within. 
The data is presented as a Web site, with each piece of malware on its own page.  Therefore, 
the server must be queried thousands of times to gather all information presented.  This 
amount of activity in a short amount of time could be viewed as an attack on their servers, and 
Symantec, being a computer security company, may block access as a security measure.  To 
prevent this, it is important to limit server query density as much as possible, by observing a 
brief wait period between subsequent queries, and by caching as much data as possible. 
Another challenge is the style of presentation of the technical details page.  This data is 
intended to be read by humans to understand the behavior of a specific piece of malware, not 
to be automatically analyzed by a computer.  Therefore, most information is presented in 
narrative prose, and, since there are multiple authors3 working on these pages, there are 
significant variances in style and syntax.  Because of this variance, it is impossible to simply 
search for patterns in the downloaded text; the data must first be normalized, taken from a 
range of possible formats and collected together in a common, easily searchable format.  This 
adds substantial complexity to the data extraction process, but is necessary to ensure accurate 
results that are not affected by the article author’s style. 
                                                     
3
 A separate data extraction script finds about 125 distinct authors.  (Appendix H) 
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Yet another result of a human-authored information source is the propensity for errors.  
Symantec’s process of analyzing malware, documenting its behavior, and presenting the 
information is performed primarily by employees, introducing the factor of human error.  Many 
simple spelling and typographical errors have been observed in the Threat Explorer (see 
Appendix N for an example, there are three ‘R’s where there should only be two.  While these 
errors do not affect human readability, (most go completely unnoticed) it creates a challenge 
for computer-based searching.  It is important to mention that some “errors” could be 
intentional, such as in cases where the malware author uses a similar-looking name to disguise 
a file or registry key, or even an error by the malware author.  This makes it impossible to 
implement an automatic spell check algorithm.  Instead, common errors are mitigated at search 
time (e.g. forward slash instead of backslash, “Current Version” instead of “CurrentVersion”) 
and the regular expressions used for pattern matching are written to be flexible.  This 
implementation compensates for many errors without creating false positives. 
To address errors, a post-process error checking script (Appendix G) was written, that compares 
previously matched strings with unmatched strings, and outputs those that are very similar (1-3 
characters different).  Many of these “errors” are intentional, as mentioned above, but some 
true errors were found.  When common errors were found (e.g. “Current Version” instead of 
“CurrentVersion”) the search script and/or regular expressions were adjusted to compensate.  
A few uncommon errors (within an acceptable margin) were left unaddressed.  The output of 
this script can be found in Appendix O. 
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One final challenge is the difficulty in compiling a complete list of autostart methods.  Methods 
have been added, removed, and modified with each release of Windows, and complete 
documentation does not exist.  Numerous tools and references were utilized to compile a 
robust list of 101 autostart locations (Appendix K), but this list may be incomplete, especially in 
respect to older versions of Windows.   
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Figure 1: Methodology Overview Flowchart 
Originally, this research was to consist of a hands-on, real-world analysis of numerous malware 
specimens, observing how they act on a machine, creating the files, registry keys, and other 
modifications necessary to ensure its automatic launch.  After discussions with faculty, it was 
determined that this information already exists, in abundance, within malware description 
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databases provided by the major antivirus companies.  These companies have considerable 
resources and experience in malware analysis; there would be little benefit to reproducing this 
information. 
To best meet the purpose of this research, existing malware descriptions will be gathered and 
statistically analyzed.  This study is focused on Symantec’s Threat Explorer, a robust 
encyclopedia of various types of computer security threats.  This database is freely available on 
the web, with built-in search and browsing functionality. 
To analyze this data, it must first be automatically gathered.  This is accomplished with a 
collection of PHP scripts.  PHP is chosen for its vast set of features, particularly its built-in HTTP 
support, necessary for reading the pages presented by Symantec.  In addition to simple regular 
expression pattern matching, which can be difficult to code and understand, these scripts utilize 
the Document Object Model (DOM) extension for PHP, which allows the parsing and 
manipulation of XML data, including HTML.  This approach results in easily human-readable 
code that can remain functional even through minor changes to Symantec’s format. 
The first script simply compiles a list of all threats in the database, correlating each title with its 
respective “docid” number and risk type.  This data is easily obtained from an HTML table on 
the “A-Z Threats and Risks” browse feature.  The script stores the gathered data in a MySQL 
database (Appendix I). 
Once a list of entries and “docid”s has been created, a second script queries the server for 
technical information on each entry.  Records with certain risk types (see Script Details and 
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Appendix C) will be ignored.  In order to reduce future queries to the Symantec server, this 
script stores the complete HTML content of each entry to a unique file for later analysis.  To 
prevent an incident that could potentially result in being blocked from the server, this script will 
perform only one request, chosen at random from the list of “docid” numbers, at a time, 
pausing for a random time between subsequent queries. 
A third script performs the processing and data locating from the gathered information.  This 
script normalizes the data and utilizes PHP’s pattern-matching search algorithms to locate key 
strings in each stored entry.  If an autostart location is referenced in the entry, a record will be 
added to the ‘findings’ database table. 
A simple supporting script is run to determine the year each malware record was discovered by 
Symantec.  While this has no effect on the data extraction, it is necessary in order to display 
time-based trends in the presentation script. 
Once this massive quantity of data is collected in the MySQL database, a final PHP script 
presents the data in a concise form, returning the results as HTML code to be viewed in a web 
browser.  The script presents this data in HTML tables, which are easily imported into Microsoft 
Excel to create graphical charts. 
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Figure 2: Program Flowchart of getids.php 
This script queries the Symantec Web server for index pages, and gathers data on each malware 
entry.  The URL $url for each index page is derived from a hard-coded URL combined with an 
‘azid’ from an array of these IDs $azids (manually gathered and coded).  The script loops 
through each $azid, and for each page, queries the server and stores its response in both a 
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runtime variable and a file (for debugging purposes).  It then reads the page into a PHP 
DOMDocument object, gathers all HTML tables, and selects the third table, which is the actual 
listing of malware page links.  The script then iterates through each row in the table, assigning 
variables to each table field.  It gets the name of the threat $name and destination URL $href 
from column two, and extracts the ‘docid’ value $docid from that URL.  It stores the risk type, if 
set, as $risktype.  The script prints the ‘docid’, risk name, and risk type to the console, inserts 
them into the MySQL table list, and then repeats for the next line.  Once all lines in the table 
have been operated on, the script sleeps for 60 seconds (to prevent hammering the server) and 
goes to work on the next index page.  The PHP Document Object Model extension allows this 
script to be very short and efficient. 





















Figure 3: Program Flowchart for pulldetails.php 
This script downloads the “Technical Details” page for each malware included in the MySQL 
table list.  It starts by querying the MySQL server for docid entries in table list, excluding certain 
risktypes that are not relevant to this research ('Hoax', 'Parental Control', 'Security Assessment 
Tool', 'Hack Tool', 'Joke', 'Removal Tool'), in a random order.  It iterates through each returned 
row and then checks if the file has already been downloaded and stored.  If it has, the next row 
is checked.  If the file has not yet been downloaded and stored, the script downloads the file 
from the Symantec server, with a URL consisting of a hard-coded portion and the docid from 
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the MySQL database, and saves it to disk.  The script then sleeps for a random time between 60 















Figure 4: Program Flowchart for fixyear.php 
In order to find trends in the malware records, it is necessary to know when each was created.  
While it is impossible to know precisely when most pieces of malware are written, it is safe to 
say that most are discovered quickly after being released.  Therefore, we can use the 
“discovered” date from the technical details page.  This script loops through every page saved 
by the previous script by listing the directory where the files are stored.  It extracts the “docid” 
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from the filename for identification, and then sets up a DOMDocument object similar to 
getids.php.  Using the DOM extension, the script selects the “tabModBdy” HTML element, 
where the textual malware description resides.  It then loops through all child nodes of that 
element, searching for the string “Discovered: “.  When this string is found, the script stores the 
value of that node as $discovered_line, then extracts the year (last 4 digits of the string) as 
$discovered_year and stops searching.  This value is compared with the first 4 digits of the 
“docid” $docid_year.  If the “year” values are different, the “discovered” year is stored in the 
MySQL database entry for this “docid”.  If they are the same, or if no “discovered” date was 
found, the “docid” year is stored.  The script then repeats for the next file in the directory, until 
all files have been operated on. 











Collect all strings 














matched string to 
MySQL database
 
Figure 5: Program Flowchart for search.php 
Once all records have been downloaded and stored, they can be analyzed.  This script has two 
main functions for each malware record: to scan for and collect registry keys or file names, and 
then to pattern-match the findings against known Windows autostart locations.  First, the script 
obtains a listing of the directory containing the cached technical details pages.  Much like 
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fixyear.php, it loops through each filename, and reads the file into a variable $html.  Unlike 
getids.php and fixyear.php, this script does not utilize the Document Object Model PHP 
extension, instead using string searches and pattern matching.  This is done to preserve subtle 
syntax hints that are lost in DOM object handling.  To extract the appropriate content from the 
page4, the script locates the “tabModBdy” element by its HTML tag, and stores it as 
$important_html. 
Once the appropriate HTML code has been extracted, it is normalized.  First, the script removes 
extraneous HTML tags and line breaks.  This makes the file paths and registry entries easily 
locatable.  The next step is to reconstruct all registry entries into a common format for pattern 
matching.  Many articles list a registry value name being placed into multiple keys (see 
Appendix O).  The script appends the value name to the end of the paths, and collects these full 
paths.  Other registry paths and file paths are also collected.  Once these strings are collected, 
they are cleaned up (replacing incorrect usage of slashes/backslashes, stripping extraneous 
characters, etc.) and matched against the regular expressions stored in MySQL (Appendix K).  If 
a match is found, a correlation between “docid” and “autorunid”, as well as the complete 
matched string, are inserted into MySQL. 
                                                     
4
 There is approximately 30 KB of extraneous HTML in each downloaded page. 
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8 Results 
The data extraction PHP scripts gathered a list of 10,349 unique records from the Symantec 
Threat Explorer database.  Of these, 310 were deemed irrelevant to this research, for having 
risk types that imply something other than a malware description, such as jokes, hoaxes, or 
removal information.  Figure 6 shows the remaining records by their year of discovery.  There is 
a clear increase in the number of malware records reported by Symantec starting around 1999. 
This trend is consistent with expectations.  As usage of computers and the Internet increased, 
so did the amount of malware.  The stabilization and later decrease can possibly be attributed 
to improvements in security measures, making malware development more difficult.  At the 
time of this study, the year 2009 is still in progress, explaining the very small number of records 
for that year.  Regardless, the amount of malware seems to be generally decreasing since 2005, 
certainly a positive trend. 
 
Figure 6: Threat Explorer Records per Year 
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The 10,039 relevant files were downloaded files and searched for known autostart locations, 
and 8,212 correlations were found.  Figure 7 shows the number of correlations per year.  It is 
important to note that some records contained multiple autostart methods, and some 
contained none at all.  This explains why there are more findings than records in some years. 
 
Figure 7: Autostart Location Findings per Year 
While the number of findings per year is mostly similar to the number of records found in that 
given year, the year 2008 is a notable exception.  Symantec included a large number of 
malware records without any technical details during this year.  The file sizes of downloaded 
records are shown in Appendix I.  There is a noticeable flat area in 2008 where all records were 
approximately 34 KB, the size of a page without any technical details.  This explains the 
relatively low number of findings for that year.  
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8.1 Most Common Methods 
Over 100 autostart locations were searched for, and 56 were located at least once.  The 
complete data can be seen in Appendix A.  The most common locations are described here. 
 
Figure 8: Yearly Findings of HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run 
 
Figure 9: Yearly Findings of HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run 
The two most common autostart locations found in the Symantec Threat Explorer are shown in 
Figure 8 and Figure 9.  These two registry locations are very simple; any filename under this 
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legitimate applications to start automatically, such as messaging programs.  Because of its 
relatively simplicity, and compatibility with all Windows operating systems, it is commonly used 
by malware as well.  Fortunately, this is one of the most visible autostart locations for a 
knowledgeable user; the list of programs using this method can be seen with the ‘msconfig’ 
tool built in to all recent versions of Windows (Windows 2000 excepted).  This allows users to 
enable or disable the automatic launch of programs that use this method through a simple 
checkbox user interface. 
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Figure 10: Yearly Findings of HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services 
The fourth most common autostart location used by malwares reported in the Symantec Threat 
Explorer (the third can be seen under Mostly Obsolete Methods, below) is shown in Figure 10.  
This registry key is used for system service registrations, including drivers.  Malware authors use 
this key to register their code as a system service, which are typically started automatically and 
maintained by the system.  This can make it hard for an unknowledgeable user to locate and 
remove the malware.  This form of system service is only supported on “NT-based” versions of 
Windows, the traditional “consumer-level” versions (95-Me) are not affected.  This explains the 
rarity of this autostart method prior to the release of Windows XP in late 2001, when the “NT-
based” kernel began to gain substantial market share.  When this autostart method is utilized, it 
can be difficult to determine how the malware process starts.  While the ‘msconfig’ tool can 
enable and disable system services, it is in a lesser-used area of the application, and the 
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Figure 11: Yearly Findings of HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\Browser Helper Objects 
The fifth most common autostart location identified by this research does not actually invoke 
execution with the operating system, but instead Internet Explorer.  Supported since the 
release of Internet Explorer 4.0 in 1997, a Browser Helper Object (BHO) is attached to every 
instance of the browser when it is opened.  It can be used legitimately for browser add-ons 
such as toolbars and file viewer plugins, but malware may attach itself as a BHO to generate 
pop-up advertisements or record browsing activity.  This method gained popularity among 
malware authors starting in 2002, and was present in 6% of malware discovered in 2006.  As it 
runs within the iexplore.exe process, it is difficult for an end user to pinpoint.  Internet Explorer 
7, released in October 2006, includes a BHO management tool, allowing the user to easily view 
and disable unwanted add-ons without having to edit the registry.  This feature, along with 
other browser security improvements, may have had an effect on the popularity of this 
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8.2 Mostly Obsolete Methods 
 
Figure 12: Yearly Findings of HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunServices 
The third most common autostart location, as shown in Figure 12, displays an interesting trend.  
While this method was used by approximately 12% of all malware reported by Symantec 
between 1997 and 2005, its use decreased sharply in 2006, and is almost nonexistent since 
then.  According to Microsoft Knowledge Base article 137367, this key, and a related 
‘RunServicesOnce’ key, apply only to Windows 95, Windows 98, and Windows Millennium 
Edition (Me).  This explains the substantial decrease in usage of this method around 2006, as 
Windows 98/Me lost market share to Windows XP, and later Windows Vista.  Therefore, this 
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Figure 13: Yearly Findings of WIN.INI 
 
Figure 14: Yearly Findings of SYSTEM.INI 
Two other mostly obsolete autostart methods are the WIN.INI and SYSTEM.INI files.  These files 
were used in early versions of Windows for a wide range of configuration options, including 
automatic program execution.  They were, in many ways, precursors to the Windows registry.  
While these files accounted for a substantial portion of malware autostarts in the 1990s and 
early 2000s, their use sharply decreased after 2003.  This trend is presumably due to the 
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8.3 Up-and-Coming Techniques 
 
Figure 15: Yearly Findings of Autorun.inf 
One relatively new malware autostart method takes advantage of the Windows AutoRun 
component, a feature intended to facilitate software installation and enhance the user 
experience by automatically running a command when a disk is mounted or a drive is “double-
clicked”.  While this is a genuinely useful feature, malware authors have exploited this 
functionality not only to spread malware, but also for repeated execution on an infected 
machine.  By simply creating an Autorun.inf file in the root of a volume, malicious code can be 
run any time a user inserts a disk or even attempts to browse a hard drive.  Even when AutoRun 
is disabled on certain systems5, the risk remains (Dormann, 2009).  While Windows XP and 
earlier operating systems automatically run any application specified in the file, Windows Vista 
adds a layer of protection with a mandatory popup many before any application is launched.  
Measures such as this, combined with up-to-date security patches, may protect users from 
malware infection and prevent this autostart method from gaining much more popularity. 
                                                     
5
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Figure 16: Yearly Findings for HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image Files Execution Options 
Another dangerous autostart method, virtually unknown to most I.T. professionals, is the Image 
File Execution Options registry key.  This key is part of a feature built into the Windows NT 
family of operating systems, legitimately used for software debugging.  If a subkey exists for a 
given executable, the operating system will run the specified “debugger” instead of that 
executable.  The debugger then runs the executable. 
However, if a malicious executable is listed as a “debugger”, it will be executed in place of the 
original application, no matter the context.  To an end user, it will appear as though the original 
application has been overwritten with a malicious file, but replacing the application with a 
known clean version will not resolve the problem.  Beyond the obvious capability of executing 
malicious files without the user’s knowledge, this capability could potentially be very 
dangerous; critical security applications could be disabled with a simple registry key.  (Zdrnja, 
2008)  Many tools that monitor startup entries, such as msconfig.exe, do not handle this 



















HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options
count
% of malwares
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This key was not utilized as a malware execution method until 2005.  It has rapidly increased in 
popularity since then, and was present in over 6% of malwares discovered by Symantec in 2009.  
As this is an intended feature, it is not easy to disable this vulnerability, and it remains 
unpatched.  A possible solution would be a forced confirmation window before starting the 
“debugger”; similar to what has been implemented for AutoRun in Windows Vista (above).  
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9 Future Work 
There are possibilities for future research into this subject.  This thesis is focused on a single 
primary source for malware analysis, the Symantec Threat Explorer.  As malware is a significant 
problem in the computing world, multiple other firms provide details on the behavior of 
specific pieces of malware.  While the Symantec Threat Explorer is very accurate, and possibly 
the most complete collection of technical information on malware, errors were observed 
throughout the course of this research.  More accurate results could be obtained by cross-
referencing data from multiple malware analysis sources. 
Another possible area of future study would be to correlate the authors of the technical details 
pages to their individual styles.  While this study uses code to “normalize” the data found in 
these pages, developing an understanding of each author’s style, and having code that 
differentiates based on the author, could produce more accurate results. 
Finally, there is a significant opportunity to increase program efficiency.  For the purposes of 
this research, these scripts were written to be executed only once each, not as a continuous 
operation.  Therefore, performance and efficiency were not much of a consideration.  Not 
counting file download, which was made intentionally slow, the process of listing, searching, 
analyzing, and error checking the data contained in the Symantec Threat Explorer takes 
multiple hours, even on a high-end machine6.  This could likely be reduced to a fraction of that 
time with proper optimization of the program code. 
                                                     
6
 System specifications: Intel Core 2 Duo E8400, 4 GB DDR2-1066 Memory, 4x 640 GB RAID 5 Array 
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10 Conclusion 
This research met its goal to discover accurate and reliable trends on the usage of malware 
autostart techniques on Windows operating systems.  While some of the results were 
expected, some curious trends were discovered that demonstrate both success in combating 
malware, as well as increasing popularity of dangerous upcoming threats. 
Overcoming the many challenges of this research was not a superficial task.  The variances in 
writing style and formatting were more substantial than expected, and the planned-simple 
code quickly became complex and inefficient.  Data extraction from a human-readable source 
can be quite difficult, and this was no exception. 
Regardless, the methodology of this study was very effective in meeting its goal.  PHP is 
certainly a powerful language that has usage far beyond Web page preprocessing.  Its flexibility 
and immense built-in features, especially combined with the equally impressive MySQL 
database solution, proved invaluable in the course of this research. 
While this research only covers a very small portion of the massive malware epidemic, it is 
hoped that these findings will enhance professional understanding of these autostart 
techniques, especially the more obscure, to assist the battle against malware and improve 
computer security at large. 
 
Page 44 of 86 
11 Works Cited 
Barwinski, M. A. (2005). Taxonomy of Spyware and Empirical Study of Network Drive-By-
Downloads. Masters Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School. 
Dormann, W. (2009, April 14). Vulnerability Note VU#889747. Retrieved July 21, 2009, from US-
CERT: http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/889747 
Esposito, D. (1999, January). Browser Helper Objects: The Browser the Way You Want It. 
Retrieved July 19, 2009, from MSDN: http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-
us/library/bb250436(VS.85).aspx 
Gartner, Inc. (2009, June 22). Gartner Says Worldwide Security Software Revenue Grew 18.6 Per 
Cent in 2008. Retrieved June 30, 2009, from Gartner Newsroom: 
http://www.gartner.com/it/page.jsp?id=1031712 
Goebel, J., Holz, T., & Willems, C. (2007). Measurement and Analsys of Autonomous Spreading 
Malware in a University Environment. RWTH Aachen University, Center for Computing and 
Communication. 
Hearst, M. A. (1999). Untangling Text Data Mining. Association for Computational Linguistics. 
Ishibashi, K., Toyono, T., Toyama, K., Ishino, M., Ohshima, H., & Mizukoshi, I. (2005). Detecting 
Mass-Mailing Worm Infected Hosts by Mining DNS Traffic Data. NTT Corporation, NTT 
Information Sharing Platform Labs. Philadelphia: ACM. 
Jiang, X. (2006). Enabling Internet Worms and Malware Investigation and Defense using 
Virtualization. PhD Thesis, Purdue University, Center for Education and Research in Information 
Assurance and Security. 
Kıcıman, E., Maltz, D. A., Goldszmidt, M., & Platt, J. C. (2006). Mining Web Logs to Debug 
Distant Connectivity Problems. Microsoft Research. Pisa: ACM. 
Microsoft Corporation. (2007, January 19). Definition of the RunOnce Keys in the Registry. 
Retrieved July 16, 2009, from Microsoft Help and Support: 
http://support.microsoft.com/kb/137367/EN-US/ 
Qattan, F., & Thernelius, F. (2004). Deficiencies in Current Software Protection Mechanisms and 
Alternatives for Securing Computing Integrity. Masters Thesis, Stockholm University - Royal 
Institute of Technology, Department of Computer and Systems Sciences. 
Rozinov, K. (2004). Reverse Code Engineering: An In-Depth Analysis of the Bagle Virus. Bell Labs. 
Russinovich, M., & Cogswell, B. (2009, April 6). Autoruns for Windows v9.41. Retrieved April 30, 
2009, from Microsoft TechNet: http://technet.microsoft.com/en-
us/sysinternals/bb963902.aspx 
Page 45 of 86 
Symantec Corporation. (2009, May 12). Threat Explorer. Retrieved May 17, 2009, from 
Symantec: http://www.symantec.com/business/security_response/threatexplorer/index.jsp 
Symantec. (2008, April). Symantec Internet Security Threat Report. Retrieved April 12, 2009, 
from http://eval.symantec.com/mktginfo/enterprise/white_papers/b-
whitepaper_exec_summary_internet_security_threat_report_xiii_04-2008.en-us.pdf 
The PHP Group. (2009, May 22). Document Object Model. Retrieved May 28, 2009, from PHP: 
Hypertext Preprocessor: http://us3.php.net/manual/en/book.dom.php 
Wang, Y.-M., Roussev, R., Verbowski, C., Johnson, A., Wu, M.-W., Huang, Y., et al. (2004). 
Gatekeeper: Monitoring Auto-Start Extensibility Points (ASEPs) for Spyware Management. Large 
Installation System Administration , XVIII, 33-46. 
Wikipedia contributors. (2009, April 17). Malware. Retrieved April 20, 2009, from 
http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Malware&oldid=284374181 
Zdrnja, B. (2008, February 28). Abusing Image File Execution Options. Retrieved July 25, 2009, 
from Internet Storm Center: http://isc.sans.org/diary.html?storyid=4039 
Zelonis, K. (2004). Avoiding the Cyber Pandemic: A Public Health Approach to Preventing 
Malware Propagation. Masters Thesis, Carnegie Mellon University, Heinz School. 
 
Page 46 of 86 
12 Appendix 
Appendix A: Findings of Each Autostart Method ......................................................................... 47 
Appendix B: getids.php ................................................................................................................. 49 
Appendix C: pulldetails.php .......................................................................................................... 51 
Appendix D: fixyear.php................................................................................................................ 52 
Appendix E: search.php ................................................................................................................ 54 
Appendix F: results.php ................................................................................................................ 59 
Appendix G: errorcheck.php ......................................................................................................... 61 
Appendix H: authors.php .............................................................................................................. 67 
Appendix I: File Sizes for Downloaded “Technical Details” Pages ................................................ 69 
Appendix J: MySQL Table Diagram ............................................................................................... 69 
Appendix K: ‘autoruns’ MySQL Table ........................................................................................... 70 
Appendix L: Symantec Threat Explorer – Browse A-Z .................................................................. 76 
Appendix M: Symantec Threat Explorer – Technical Details ........................................................ 77 
Appendix N: Error in Threat Explorer Technical Details Page ...................................................... 78 
Appendix O: “Backwards” Registry Path Listing ........................................................................... 79 
Appendix P: Error by Malware Author .......................................................................................... 80 
Appendix Q: Output of errorcheck.php ........................................................................................ 81 
Page 47 of 86 




































































HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run 4 6 10 40 115 380 750 719 776 333 247 125 55 3562 
HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run 1 1 1 4 12 67 110 191 316 138 93 85 26 1045 
HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunServices 2 3 1 9 26 92 197 170 289 30 18 4 1 843 
HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services 0 0 0 1 2 7 32 59 97 106 66 38 14 422 
HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\Browser Helper Objects 1 0 0 0 0 4 22 61 78 59 35 24 4 288 
WIN.INI 1 1 11 12 25 60 91 35 22 3 1 1 2 268 
SYSTEM.INI 1 0 4 7 15 32 57 33 20 5 4 2 3 183 
Autorun.inf 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 4 8 4 51 43 52 164 
C:\%windir%\All Users\Start Menu\Programs\Startup (All Users Startup) 0 0 1 2 5 11 45 28 13 10 24 9 4 152 
HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\Shell 0 0 0 0 0 2 6 10 29 23 42 15 3 130 
HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnce 0 0 1 2 3 14 21 31 23 6 10 5 2 118 
HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Toolbar 0 0 0 0 0 0 11 26 35 13 7 1 0 93 
HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Active Setup\Installed Components 0 0 0 0 1 3 17 6 15 13 18 6 11 90 
C:\Documents and Settings\username\Start Menu\Programs\Startup (per user startup) 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 15 19 18 17 9 3 84 
HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnce 0 0 0 1 1 2 20 23 20 3 4 4 0 78 
HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\Userinit 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 1 7 18 27 13 3 72 
HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer\Run 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 5 13 17 16 10 1 69 
HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows\Run 0 0 0 0 1 2 13 21 13 3 6 0 0 59 
HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\Notify 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 4 8 32 4 7 0 58 
HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 11 12 11 17 53 
HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\ShellServiceObjectDelayLoad 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 18 11 7 9 0 0 50 
HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows\Load 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 7 14 13 8 0 0 47 
HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Extensions 0 0 0 0 1 0 2 6 13 12 3 0 0 37 
HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer\Run 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 3 4 8 4 3 5 28 
HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\UrlSearchHooks 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 7 7 3 1 0 0 21 
HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\System 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 3 6 7 2 0 20 
HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnceEx 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 4 5 3 1 1 0 19 
HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunServicesOnce 0 0 0 0 1 5 4 2 2 1 1 1 0 17 
HKCU\Control Panel\Desktop\Scrnsave.exe 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 3 2 3 3 1 16 
HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\ShellExecuteHooks 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 4 0 5 3 0 14 
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HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Shell Extensions\Approved 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 1 3 4 2 0 13 
HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Extensions 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 6 5 0 0 0 13 
HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Explorer Bars 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 4 1 4 1 0 0 11 
HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows\Appinit_Dlls 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 6 2 1 11 
HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\SharedTaskScheduler 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 2 1 0 0 0 7 
HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\WinSock2\Parameters\Protocol_Catalog9\Catalo
g_Entries 
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 3 0 1 1 1 7 
HKLM\SOFTWARE\Classes\Protocols\Filter 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 2 1 0 0 7 
HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\Shell 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 2 2 7 
HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Explorer Bars 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 1 0 1 0 6 
HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Command Processor\Autorun 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 2 2 0 0 5 
HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Active Setup\Installed Components 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 2 0 0 1 0 4 
HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Desktop\Components 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 0 0 0 3 
HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\ShellIconOverlayIdentifiers 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 3 
HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\GinaDLL 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 3 
HKLM\SOFTWARE\Classes\Directory\ShellEx\ContextMenuHandlers 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 0 0 3 
HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Command Processor\Autorun 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 2 
HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Shell Extensions\Approved 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 2 
HKLM\SOFTWARE\Classes\CLSID\{083863F1-70DE-11d0-BD40-00A0C911CE86}\Instance 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 2 
HKLM\SOFTWARE\Classes\Protocols\Handler 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 2 
HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Drivers32 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 2 
HKLM\SOFTWARE\Classes\Folder\ShellEx\ContextMenuHandlers 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\UIHost 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\Notification Packages 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Print\Monitors 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 
HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager\BootExecute 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
HKLM\SOFTWARE\Classes\Exefile\Shell\Open\Command\(Default) 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
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Appendix K: ‘autoruns’ MySQL Table 
id location regex 
1 Autorun.inf /Autorun\.inf/i 
2 WIN.INI /WIN\.INI/i 
3 SYSTEM.INI /SYSTEM\.INI/i 
4 C:\%windir%\All Users\Start Menu\Programs\Startup 
(All Users Startup) 
/(C:\\)?(%?Windows%?|%Windir%|Documents and Settings|WINNT\\Profiles)(\\
(All Users|%AllUsers(Profile)?%))?\\Start Menu\\Programs\\Start ?up/i 
5 C:\Documents and Settings\username\Start Menu\Programs\
Startup (per user startup) 
/(C:\\)?((Documents and Settings|(%?Windows%?|%windir%|winnt)\\Profiles)\\
.*?(profile|current user|user ?name).*?|%user ?profile%)\\Start Menu\\Programs\\
Start ?up/i 






































17 HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Active Setup\Installed 
Components 
/(HKEY_CURRENT_USER|HKCU|HKEY_USERS?\\\.DEFAULT)\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\
Active Setup\\Installed Components/i 
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21 HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Explorer Bars /(HKEY_CURRENT_USER|HKCU|HKEY_USERS?\\\.DEFAULT)\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\
Internet Explorer\\Explorer Bars/i 

































































































47 HKLM\SOFTWARE\Classes\Filter /(HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE|HKLM)\\SOFTWARE\\Classes\\Filter/i 





50 HKLM\SOFTWARE\Classes\Protocols\Filter /(HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE|HKLM)\\SOFTWARE\\Classes\\Protocols\\Filter/i 
51 HKLM\SOFTWARE\Classes\Protocols\Handler /(HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE|HKLM)\\SOFTWARE\\Classes\\Protocols\\Handler/i 




53 HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Command Processor\Autorun /(HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE|HKLM)\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Command Processor\\Autorun/i 
54 HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Ctf\LangBarAddin /(HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE|HKLM)\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Ctf\\LangBarAddin/i 
55 HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Explorer Bars /(HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE|HKLM)\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Internet Explorer\\
Explorer Bars/i 
56 HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Extensions /(HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE|HKLM)\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Internet Explorer\\Extensions/i 
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Image File Execution Options 
/(HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE|HKLM)\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\






































Authentication\Credential Provider Filters 
/(HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE|HKLM)\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\










Explorer\Browser Helper Objects 
/(HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE|HKLM)\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\
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